Annals of Health Law
Volume 22
Issue 1 Winter 2013

Article 5

2013

A New Regulatory Strategy Against Smoking - Weekly Lotteries
and Increasing Credit Balance as Incentives to Modify Behavior
Gerrit Beckhaus

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerrit Beckhaus A New Regulatory Strategy Against Smoking - Weekly Lotteries and Increasing Credit
Balance as Incentives to Modify Behavior, 22 Annals Health L. 97 (2013).
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol22/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annals of Health Law by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact lawlibrary@luc.edu.

Beckhaus: A New Regulatory Strategy Against Smoking - Weekly Lotteries and

A New Regulatory Strategy Against Smoking Weekly Lotteries and Increasing Credit Balance as
Incentives to Modify Behavior
Gerrit M. Beckhaus*
INTRODUCTION

Tobacco use still is the leading global cause of premature death, killing
nearly 6 million people worldwide each year,' not to mention its dramatic
social and economic consequences. In the United States alone, smoking
accounts for 443,000 deaths per year, approximately 49,000 of these deaths
being the result of secondhand smoke exposure.2 The number of smokers is
estimated at more than one billion worldwide, roughly one third of the
world's adult population.3 Seven hundred million children are exposed to
secondhand tobacco smoke, particularly at home.4 Despite the
implementation of extensive tobacco control strategies within the last
decades-such as, increasing prices through taxation, information
campaigns, advertisement bans, or the regulation of smoking in public
areas, particularly in high income countries (HIC)- tobacco's threat to
5
global health remains far from being solved. In the United States, one
could observe a dramatic drop of the number of smokers over the last fifty
years from the peak of 42.4% of all adults in 1965 to 19.3% in 2010.6
* Attorney in Hamburg, Germany; LL.M., Yale Law School, Ph.D. (Dr. iur.), EMBA,
University of Muenster, Germany. I gratefully acknowledge the insights, reflections or
comments of Ronald Bayer, Gesa Beckhaus, Lennart Beckhaus, Thomas Pogge, and Jennifer
Ruger.
1.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2011 WARNING ABOUT THE DANGERS OF TOBACCO 8 (2011).
2. Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of
Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses - United States, 2000-2004, 57 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1226, 1226-1227 (2008); See also Ali H. Mokdad, James S.
Marks, Donna F. Stroup & Julie L. Gerberding, Actual Causes of Death in the United States,
2000, 291 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1238 passim (2004) (Errata, 293 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 298
(2005)).
3. INST. OF MED., PROMOTING CARDIOVASCULAR HEALTH IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
A CRITICAL CHALLENGE TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL HEALTH 72 (2010).
4.

Why

is

Smoking

an

Issue

for

Non-Smokers?,

WORLD

HEALTH

ORG.,

http://www.who.int/features/qa/60/en/index.html (last visited Jan.17, 2013).

5.

World Health Org. supra note 1, passim.

6.

CTR.
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However, tobacco use remains widespread among people of low
socioeconomic status. Similar developments can be found in other HICs.
In low and middle-income countries (LIC and MIC), the total number of
smokers is still increasing, 9 largely due to the aggressive marketing of
transnational tobacco companies searching for new markets.10
Aguably, smoking is a modifiable behavior. It is therefore crucial to find
a mechanism other than the existing tobacco control strategies, a
mechanism that can influence people in their decision to refrain from
beginning to smoke or convince them to cease smoking. Based on insights
from behavioral economics, this paper develops a novel regulatory model
providing positive economic incentives to affect people's choice regarding
tobacco use. The model takes a dual approach consisting of a weekly
lottery as well as an account with an increasing credit balance that can only
be accessed after a specific period of non-smoking. Given the required
administrative efforts, particularly the process of verifying the smoking
status, the model's implementation at present seems more realistic in HICs.
This does not mean that it is not transferable to the situation in LICs and
MICs." The following will focus specifically on the United States.
IN CURRENT CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND ADULTS, UNITED
STATES,
1965-2010 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/

tables/trends/cig-smoking/index.htm.
7. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Disparities and Inequalities Report
- United States, 2011, 60 (SUPPL. 1) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1, 109-112
(2011); Focus GROUP, SMOKING HABITS AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN Low SocioECONOMIC STATUS POPULATIONS 1 (2004). See also Roland Bayer & Jennifer Stuber,
Tobacco Control, Stigma, and Public Health: Rethinking the Relations, 96 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 47, 49 (2006); LUIs G. ESCOBEDO ET AL., Sociodemographic Characteristics of
Cigarette Smoking Initiation in the United States - Implications for Smoking Prevention
Policy, 264 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1550 passim (1990).
8.
MARTIN BOBAK, PRABHAT JHA, SON NGUYEN & MARTIN JARVIS, Poverty and
Smoking, in TOBACCO CONTROL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 41 passim (Prabhat Jha & Frank
J. Chaloupka eds., 2000); Gary A. Giovino et al., Epidemiology of Tobacco Use and
Dependence, 17 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 48 passim (1995); Knut-Olaf Haustein, Smoking and
Poverty, 13 EUR. J. CARDIOVASCULAR PREVENTION & REHABILITATION 312 passim (2006);
Richard Layte & Christopher T. Whelan, Explaining Social Class Inequalities in Smoking:
The Role of Education, Self-Efficacy, and Deprivation, 25 EUR. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 399
passim (2009). But see BORN HBELL, ET AL., THE ESPAD REPORT 2003: ALCOHOL AND
OTHER DRUG USE AMONG STUDENTS IN 35 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 196-197 (2004).
9.
See, e.g., JESSE B. BUMP, MICHAEL R. REICH, OLUSoJI ADEYI & S. KHETRAPAL,
TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TOBACCO CONTROL IN Low- AND MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES 17-19 (2009); INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 72; RICHARD PETO & ALAN D.
LOPEZ, Future Worldwide Health Effects of Current Smoking Patterns, in CRITICAL ISSUES
IN GLOBAL HEALTH 154 passim (C. Everett Koop, Clarence E. Pearson, M. Roy Schwarz

eds., 2001).
10.

MICHAEL ERIKSEN, JUDITH MACKAY, HANA Ross, THE TOBACCO ATLAS

60 (4

h ed.

2012).
11.

For potential adjustments with regard to the applicability in LICs and MICs see infra
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In Part I, this paper provides an overview of the status quo of tobacco
use, particularly in the United States, and its consequences as well as
present tobacco control strategies and their impact. Part II highlights the
critical period of smoking initiation as well as challenges for smoking
cessation. It further identifies insights from the field of behavioral
economics relevant for any attempt to modify human behavior through
incentives and points out selected studies that have relied on incentives to
influence decision-making processes. Part II also evaluates whether paying
people for non-smoking is a desirable concept. Finally, Part III discusses, in
detail, the suggested model against smoking initiation and for smoking
cessation.
I. STATUS QUO

This section first deals with the status quo of tobacco use and its
consequences in the United States. It then describes the present tobacco
control strategies and examines their impact.
A Tobacco Use and Its Consequences
As indicated above, 12 tobacco use remains the number one cause of
preventable death and illness in the United States - responsible for about
one in five deaths annually.13 Smoking accounts for more deaths than
alcohol, AIDS, car accidents, illegal drugs, murders, and suicides
combined. 14 On average, smokers die thirteen to fourteen years earlier than
non-smokers.15 This adds up to approximately 5.1 million years of
potential life lost annually just in the United States.1 6 In addition, smoking
leads to several serious diseases, including different types of cancer, stroke,
heart and lung diseases.1 For example, smoking is estimated to increase
the risk of coronary heart disease" or a stroke 9 by approximately two to

Part III.D.

12. See supra Introduction.
13. CDC supra note 2, at 1226.
14. Mokdad supra note 2, at 1239-42.
15. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality,
Years of Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses - United States, 1995-1999, 51
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP, 300, 301 (2002).
16.
17.

See CDC supra note 2, at 1226.
See CDC supra note 2, at 1226.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: A REP. OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 384-392 (2004).
19. Id. at 395; Ira S. Ockene & Nancy Houston Miller, Cigarette Smoking,
Cardiovascular Disease, and Stroke - A Statement for Healthcare Professionals from the
American Heart Association, 96 CIRCULATION 3243 passim (1997).
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four times, and increase the risk of developing lung cancer 20 in men by
twenty-three times. As of 2010, 19.3% of all adults in the United States,
equal to 45.3 million people continue to smoke.21
In addition to the health impairments, tobacco use has serious economic
implications.22 The annual health care expenditures caused by smoking are
abundant. In the period from 2000 to 2004, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) estimated the average total public and private payments are
estimated to have been $96 billion per year.23 Federal and state government
costs for Medicaid supposedly amount to approximately $30.9 billion of
that sum, 24 and federal government expenditures for Medicare to $27.4
billion. 25 Further tobacco-related consequences include productivity losses,
adding up to a value of yearly $97 billion per year over the same period.26
This amount only includes the losses from shortened productive work lives
due to smoking-caused premature deaths. The economic costs mentioned so
far sum up to - and this was only in 1999 - $3,391 annually for every
smoking adult.2
On top of that, productivity losses that are harder to measure must be
included, such as costs from smoking-caused disabilities, absenteeism, and
productivity declines. For instance, smoking workers accumulate almost
twice the average annual absenteeism of never-smokers (6.0 instead of 3.2
days). 28 The likeliness of smoking workers to have work limitations
reducing their productivity is twice as high as for never-smokers (6.2% to
3%).29 Smoking workers tend to take more frequent and longer breaks than
non-smokers, further contributing to declining productivity.30
Further costs accrue from social security survivors insurance for the

20. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. supra note 18, at 43.
21. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking
Among Adults Aged > 18 Years - United States, 2005-2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1207, 1208 (2011).
22. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. supra note 18, at 863-71.
23. CDC, supra note 2, at 1228.
24. See CDC, SUSTAINING STATE PROGRAMS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL: DATA HIGHLIGHTS
2006 16-17 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/state data/
data highlights/2006/pdfs/dataHighlights06rev.pdf.
25. JESSICA GUILFOYLE, THE TOLL OF TOBACCO IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
(2012), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0072.pdf.
26. CDC, supra note 2, at 1228. See also William B. Bunn III et al., Effect of Smoking
Status on Productivity Loss, 48 J. OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED. 1099 passim (2006).
27. See CDC, supra note 15, at 300-01.
28. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CDC, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 2006 (2006).
29. Id.
30. Steve Parrott, Christine Godfrey, Martin Raw, Costs of Employee Smoking in the
Workplace in Scotland, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 187, 187 (2000).
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hundreds of thousands of children who have lost at least one parent,31
property losses from smoking-caused fires ($0.5 billion per year),' 2 and
tobacco related cleaning and maintenance.3 3
On the other hand, tobacco sales also generate direct income through
taxes, which differs considerably from state to state.34 In 2009, total
tobacco tax revenues amounted to more than $17 billion.35 Further benefits
from tobacco include the direct and indirect creation of jobs, taxes paid by
the United States manufacturers themselves, money spent on advertisement,
and the controversially discussed36 savings in social security expenditures,
pensions, and benefits due to tobacco-caused premature deaths.
B. Present Tobacco Control Strategies
The present tobacco control strategies can be divided into four main
groups: increasing prices through taxation, information campaigns,
restriction of advertisement and promotion, and the regulation of smoking
in public areas. Providing programs against tobacco addiction is dealt with
as a separate aspect. While each individual approach shows an effect for
itself, a combination of these strategies is considered to be more effective
than the added effectiveness of each independent one.3 One key element of
31. See Bruce N. Leistikow, Daniel C. Martin, Christina E. Milano, Estimates of
Smoking-Attributable Deaths at Ages 15-54, Motherless or Fatherless Youths, and Resulting
Social Security Costs in the United States in 1994, 30 PREVENTATIVE MED. 353 passim
(2000).
32. JOHN R. HALL, JR., THE SMOKING-MATERIAL FIRE PROBLEM 1 (2007).
33. Cf. DAVID H. MUDARRI, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SMOKING RESTRICTIONS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE SMOKE-FREE ENVIRONMENT ACT OF 1993 (H.R. 3434) at ES8-ES9
(1994).

34. See FEDERATION OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE EXCISE TAX RATES ON CIGARETTES (As of
Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cigarette.pdf (last visited on
Aug. 26, 2012). See infra Part I.B.
35. THE URBAN INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TAX POLICY CENTER, STATE AND
LOCAL TOBACCO TAX REVENUE, SELECTED YEARS 1977-2009 (2011), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=403 (last visited on Aug.
26, 2012).
36. See, e.g., Thomas A. Hodgson, Cigarette Smoking and Lifetime Medical
Expenditures, 70 MILBANK Q. 81 passim (1992); Barbara C. Lippiatt, Measuring Medical
Cost and Life Expectancy - Impacts of Changes in Cigarette Sales, 19 PREVENTATIVE. MED.
515 passim (1990); Kenneth E. Warner, Thomas A. Hodgson, Caitlin E. Carroll, Medical
Costs of Smoking in the United States: Estimates, Their Validity, and Their Implications, 8
TOBACCO CONTROL 290 passim (1999); Kenneth E. Warner, Health and Economic
Implications of a Tobacco-Free-Society, 258 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2080 passim (1987); Wendy
Max, The Financial Impact of Smoking on Health-Related Costs: AReview of the Literature,
15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 321 passim (2001).
37. John P. Pierce, Victoria M. White, Sherry L. Emery, What Public Health Strategies
are Needed to Reduce Smoking Initiation?, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 258, 260 (2012); Robert
L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 Loy. L.A. L.
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these strategies - and simultaneously an important aim - is the
denormalization of smoking through a social norm change, 38 which
naturally comes along with the social stigmatization of smokers.39
Increasing the price of cigarettes by significantly raising tobacco excise
taxes is widely regarded as one of the most effective policies for reducing
tobacco use, proven by almost every study, irrespective of the demographic
group or the economic status of the country examined. 40 The increase of
cigarette prices particularly discourages youths from smoking. 41 By 1969,
every state in the United States had introduced tobacco excise taxes.42 Over
the years, theses taxes were raised but still vary significantly from state to
state. As of January 2012, tax rates per pack of cigarettes are the lowest in
Missouri ($0.17) and the highest in New York ($4.35).43 The average
excise tax among all states lies at $1.46 per pack.t Besides the state taxes,
there is an additional federal tax rate for cigarettes. It was recently raised
from $0.39 to $1.01 per pack with the enactment of the Children's Health
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009.45 However, while
increasing cigarette prices might very well lead to a continuing reduction of
smokers, tobacco excise taxes are regressive and therefore clearly
disadvantage poor consumers. Given that the majority of smokers in the

REv. 1721, 1724 (2008).
38. April Roeseler & David Burns, The Quarter That Changed the World, 19 (SUPPL. 1)
TOBACCO CONTROL i3 passim (2010).
39. Critical with regard to this aspect: Roland Bayer & Jennifer Stuber, Tobacco
Control, Stigma, and Public Health: Rethinking the Relations, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 47
passim (2006).
40. Cf. Frank J. Chaloupka, Macro-Social Influences: The Effects of Prices and
Tobacco-Control Policies on the Demand for Tobacco Products, 1 NICOTINE & TOBACCO
RES. S77 passim (1999); Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of
Smoking, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, VOL. 1B 1539, 1546-1565 (Kenneth Arrow,
Michael Intriligator eds., 2000); COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES,
BARRIERS, AND CONSEQUENCES, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NATION 182 (2007); Craig A. Gallet & John A. List, Cigarette Demand: AMeta-Analysis of
Elasticities, 12 HEALTH ECON. 821 passim (2002); Michelle Leverett, Marice Ashe, Susan
Gerard et al., Tobacco Use: The impact of prices, 30 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 88 passim (2002).
41. See, e.g., Frank J. Chaloupka, supra note 40, at S78-S79; Alexander Ding, Youth Are
More Sensitive to Price Changes in Cigarettes than Adults, 76 YALE J. BIOL. MED. 115
passim (2003); Lan Liang, Frank J. Chaloupka, Mark Nichter et al., Prices, Policies and
Youth Smoking, 98(SUPPL. 1) ADDICTION 105 passim (2003).
42. See
Cigarette
Taxes,
TAx
FOUND.,
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxtopics/cigarette-taxes (last visited on Aug. 26, 2012).
43. See State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE
KIDS, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf (last visited on Aug.
26, 2012).
44. Id.
45. H.R.Res.2, 111th Cong. § 701 (2009) (enacted).
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United States are of low socioeconomic status, 46 increasing prices to a
certain level signifies a de facto ban for the majority of smokers. Such a
coercive paternalistic approach raises concerns about fairness and the
significance of individual autonomy, which are amplified by nicotine's
addictive character. 4 It also entails risks of smuggling or other illegal forms
of access as experienced during the Prohibition Era. 48 The extent that
positive health benefits and the fact that tobacco taxes do not remotely
cover the expenditures caused by smoking 49 may justify ruling out these
concerns shall not be decided here.
Information campaigns about health risks are another important tobacco
control strategy. Since the landmark Surgeon's General Report from 1964,so
numerous reports have raised the public's level of awareness with regard to
the risks of tobacco use, including the addictive character of nicotine. 1
One considerable aspect of informational initiatives is the compulsory,
sometimes quite drastic, health warnings on cigarette packs that have
52
proven to affect consumers, albeit only for the first confrontations.
However, one might argue that tobacco related health risks today are
common knowledge, at least to the adult population, leaving little need for
further efforts in this area.53
Attempts to control tobacco advertisement by bans and restrictions have
rarely been successful. 54 Instead, they provoke counter-advertising and
other striking ways to circumvent regulative efforts. For instance, the ban
on broadcast media advertising led the tobacco industry to focus very
46. See supra Introduction.
47. Cf. Neal L. Benowitz & Jack E. Henningfield, Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for
Addiction: The Implications for Tobacco Regulation, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 123 passim
(1994); Neal L. Benowitz, Nicotine addiction, 362 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 2295 passim
(2010).
48.

Rabin, supra note 37, at 1753.

49.

See Chaloupka & Warner supra note 40, at 1565-84; supra Part I.A.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,

50.

PUBLIC
HEALTH SERV. PUB. No. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).

51. COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE:
CONSEQUENCES supra note 40, at 91; Rabin supra note 37,

STRATEGIES,

BARRIERS,

AND

at 1750-52.
52. See, e.g., Ron Borland et al., How Reactions to Cigarette Packet Health Warnings
Influence Quitting: Findings from the ITC Four-Country Survey, in 104 ADDICTION 669
passim (2009); Ron Borland et al., Impact of Graphic and Text Warnings on Cigarette
Packs: Findings from Four Countries over Five Years, in 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 358 passim
(2009); David Hammond et al., Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing
Smokers About the Risks of Smoking: Findings from the International Tobacco Control
(ITC) Four Country Survey, in 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iiil9 passim (Supp. III 2006).
53. See Rabin supra note 37, at 1726.
54. COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND
CONSEQUENCES supra note 40, at 112-14.
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successfully on promotional activities, print and billboard advertising. 5 In
reaction to the expanded restrictions on industry marketing and political
activity agreed upon in the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) of 1998
between forty-six states and the major tobacco companies, the tobacco
companies reallocated their efforts to the relatively unregulated retail sales
environment. Nevertheless, the present restrictions on tobacco advertising
and promotion have, without doubt, contributed to repel the public presence
of smoking. It seems, however, that there are barely any measures with a
meaningful potential impact left to significantly improve the current
system.
The fourth group of tobacco control strategies, the regulation of smoking
in public areas, constitutes a particularly important element in the process
of social denormalization of smoking. Banning smoking from worksites,
restaurants, public buildings, and even public parks not only led to direct
health benefits for non-smokers, but also imposed a deterring
inconvenience factor on the smoking population.58 There is little room for
improvement in the United States today since the public sphere appears to
be almost smoke-free. Nonetheless, it remains a significant problem that
these smoke-free policies, if they do not result in smoking cessation, might
ultimately prompt people to only smoke at home-thereby exposing
children and non-smoking partners even more to secondhand smoke. 59 This
issue affects the privacy of one's home, and any regulation would be
impossible or very difficult to enforce. 60 Therefore, these potential
consequences might have to be accepted.
Worth mentioning is also the restricted access to tobacco products for
minors, which, if rigorously enforced, is deemed to be an efficient
measure.61
To provide for a comprehensive system of tobacco control measures, the
55.
COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND
CONSEQUENCES supra note 40, at 114.
56. COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND
CONSEQUENCES supra note 40, at app. L, 122.
57. For instance in New York City, see Javier C. Hernandez, Smoking Ban for Beaches
and Parks is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/

2011/02/03/nyregion/03smoking.html?_r-1&scp=1&sq=&st=nyt.
58.

Cf. COMMITTEE ON REDUCING

TOBACCO USE,

STRATEGIES,

BARRIERS,

AND

CONSEQUENCES supra note 41, at 191-93; Seth L. Emont et al., Clean Indoor Air Legislation,
Taxation, and Smoking Behaviour in the United States: An Ecological Analysis, in 2
TOBACCO CONTROL 13 passim (1992).
59. See Rabin supra note 37, at 1728.
60. Rabin supra note 37, at 1728-29.
61.
See, e.g., Chaloupka & Warner, supra note 40, at 1597-1598; Frank J. Chaloupka &

Rosalie L. Pacula, Limiting Youth Access to Tobacco: The Early Impact of the Synar
Amendment on Youth Smoking, (Working Paper) (March 1998).
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named strategies have to be complemented by providing treatment against
tobacco addiction. Combating nicotine's addictive nature often demands
access to professional advice and, in more serious cases, to pharmacological
and behavioral treatment. While nicotine addiction is commonly
underestimated with regard to its level of dependence and the difficulties of
cessation, particularly by non- or social smokers, in scientific terms,
nicotine addiction is put into the same category of addiction caused by
drugs like heroin or cocaine.62 When nicotine is inhaled and enters the
lungs, it moves to the heart and immediately passes to the brain. 63 The
rapid absorption and the high amounts of nicotine reaching the brain
contribute to developing and sustaining nicotine addiction. 64 Adolescents
are particularly susceptible and often appear to be in denial of nicotine's
health risk, its addictive nature, and the difficulty of cessation.65 Nowadays
in the United States, smokers can resort to a broad range of information
providing strategies for smoking cessation,66 amongst others given by
health-care providers, as well as to individual, group, and telephone
counseling,67 or to pharmacotherapies.68
The significant decline in tobacco use from 42.4% to 19.3% of the
United States adult population from 1965 to 201069 due to the array of
tobacco control strategies can certainly be described as one of the great
public health success stories. Nevertheless, the number of smokers is still
far from comforting, and the decline has been almost stalled over the last

62.

Dorothy K. Hatsukami, Lindsay F. Stead & Prakash C. Gupta, Tobacco Addiction,

371 LANCET 2027, 2027-28 (2008). See also Min Sohn et al., Tobacco Use and Dependence,
19(4) SEMINARS INONCOLOGY NURSING 250, 251 (2003).
63.
Benowitz, supra note 47, at 2295; Neal L. Benowitz, Clinical Pharmacology of
Nicotine: Implications for Understanding, Preventing, and Treating Tobacco Addiction, 83
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 531, 532 (2008).
64. Cf. Benowitz, supra note 47, at 2295; Hatsukami, supra note 62, at 2028; Jack E.
Henningfield & Robert M. Keenan, Nicotine Delivery Kinetics and Abuse Liability, 61 J.
CONSULT. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 743, 744 (1993).
65. See COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 40, at 89-93.
66. See, e.g., Michael C. Fiore, Dorothy K. Hatsukami & Timothy B. Baker, Effective
Tobacco Dependence Treatment, 288 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1768, 1769 (2002); Michael C.
Fiore et al.,TREATING TOBACCO USE AND DEPENDENCE: 2008 UPDATE, i, 2 (2008);
Hatsukami, supra note 62, at 2030-31; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., How
TOBACCO SMOKE CAUSES DISEASE: THE BIOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS FOR SMOKINGATTRIBUTABLE DISEASE: A REP. OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 395-402 (2010).
67. See Lindsay F. Stead, Rafael Perera & Tim Lancaster, Telephone Counselling for
Smoking Cessation, 3 THE COCHRANE LIBRARY 1, 2 (2009).
68. See Hatsukami et al., supra note 62, at 2031-34; Richard D. Hurt & Jon 0. Ebbert,
Preventing Lung Cancer by Stopping Smoking, 23(1) CLINICS IN CHEST MED. 27, 30-34

(2002).
69.

See CDC, supra note 6.
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years.70 Both call for additional and innovative measures.
II. BACKGROUND

This section provides some groundwork for the development of the new
model by first outlining the critical period of smoking initiation, second
discussing the challenges of smoking cessation, third identifying relevant
insights from behavioral economics, and fourth dealing with the
fundamental question of whether paying for non-smoking is a desirable
approach.
A Critical Period of Smoking initiation
Becoming a regular smoker is a process that usually takes time. The
initiation phase begins with early experimentation and use, which is nearly
always undertaken in a social context and progresses to a higher level of
smoking experience. In HICs, the experimentation typically occurs
between the ages of ten to twenty-four years, whereas it is deemed highly
unlikely that people who never smoked start experimenting after the age of
twenty-four years.72 In the United States, for instance, 88.2% of all adults
who had ever smoked cigarettes daily had tried their first cigarette by the
time they were eighteen years old; another 10.8% did so by age twentysix.73 The chances of transitioning to a daily smoking habit after the age of
twenty-six are less than four percent. The peak years for smoking
initiation appear to be between the ages of eleven and thirteen.7 Starting
early is particularly dangerous, as adolescents tend to falsely assess the
risks of smoking.76 Not surprisingly, the probability of ultimately becoming
70. CDC, supra note 7, at 109.
71. Won S. Choi, Elizabeth A. Gilpin, Arthur J. Farkas et al., Determining the
Probability of Future Smoking Among Adolescents, 96 ADDICTION 313 passim (2001); John
P. Pierce, Victoria M. White, Sherry L. Emery, What Public Health Strategies are Needed to
Reduce Smoking Initiation?, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 258, 258-259 (2012) [hereinafter
Strategies]; John P. Pierce, Janet M. Distefan, Robert M. Kaplan et al., The Role of Curiosity
in Smoking Initiation, 30 ADDICT. BEHAV. 685 passim (2005)
72. Stategies, supra note 71, at 259; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REGIONAL
STRATEGY FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 12-13 (2005). See also Thomas J. Glynn, Peter
Greenwald, Sherry M. Mills et al., Youth Tobacco use in the United States? Problems,
Progress, Goals, and Potential Solutions, 22 PREY. MED. 568, 571 (1993).

73. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 134 (2012).
74.
75.

Id. at 134-35.
LLOYD D. JOHNSTON,

PATRICK M. O'MALLEY, JERALD G. BACHMAN ET AL.,
MONITORING THE FUTURE - NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2007, VOLUME
I- SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS 271, 282 (2008).

76. See COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND
CONSEQUENCES, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 89-93
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a regular smoker is higher the earlier a person tries smoking. Hence, to
address the problem at its root, it is crucial to limit smoking initiation with
regard to people between the ages of ten to twenty-four years by completely
preventing experimentation with tobacco or at least by avoiding the
progression to a higher level of smoking experience through the
development of a nicotine addiction.
B. Challenges of Smoking Cessation
The challenges of smoking cessation can be summarized by the
following statistical data: in the 2010 National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) in the U.S., 68.8% of adult smokers reported that they wanted to
quit smoking, but only 6.2% actually succeeded in that year.79 Although
smoking cessation in the U.S. has lead to former smokers outnumbering
current smokers since 2002,so given that virtually every smoker in the
United States is aware of the health risks, this data is a strong indicator for
the significant addictive nature of nicotine as well as for the need for
novel additional strategies for smoking cessation. Many smokers refrain
from using available cessation counseling or medications when trying to
quit, although their efficiency is widely acknowledged. 82 Hence, one
objective of a novel strategy must be to enhance the level of acceptance of
the existing support for smoking cessation attempts and, of course, to

(2007).
77. See, e.g., Sadik A. Khuder, Hari H. Dayal, Anand B. Mutgi, Age at Smoking Onset
and its Effect on Smoking Cessation, 24 ADDICTIVE BEH. 673 passim (1999); Jiajian Chen &
Wayne J. Millar, Age of Smoking Initiation: Implications for Quitting, 9 HEALTH REPORTS
39, 41 (1998); Sherry A. Everett, Charles W. Warren, Donald Sharp et al., Initiation of
Cigarette Smoking and Subsequent Smoking Behavior Among U.S. High School Students, 29
PREV. MED. 327 passim (1999); Cf. also CDC, Health Disparities and Inequalities Report United States, 2011, 60(SUPPL. 1) SUPPL. 1 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WEEKLY 1, 109
(2011); COMMITTEE ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE supra note 76, at 88 et seq.
78. With regard to nicotine's addictive nature see in detail supra Part I.B.
79. CDC, Quitting Smoking Among Adults - United States, 2001-2010, 60 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1513, 1515-16 (2011); Cf. also for the year 2000: CDC, Cigarette
Smoking Among Adults - United States, 2000, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
642, 642-43 (2002).
80. CDC, supra note 79, at 1513, referring to CDC, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults United States, 2002, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 427 (2004).
81. See supra Part I.B.
82. See CDC, supra note 79, at 1516-19; Michael C. Fiore, Dorothy K. Hatsukami &
Timothy B. Baker, Effective Tobacco Dependence Treatment, 288 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1768
passimu (2002); MICHAEL C. FIORE ET AL., TREATING TOBACCO USE AND DEPENDENCE: 2008
UPDATE passim (2008); Dorothy K. Hatsukami, Lindsay F. Stead & Prakash C. Gupta,
Tobacco addiction, 371 LANCET 2027 passim (2008); Shu-Hong Zhu et al., Smoking
Cessation with and Without Assistance: A Population-Based Analysis, 18 AM. J. PREY. MED.
305 passim (2000).
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introduce new and more successful mechanisms.
C. Insights from Behavioral Economics
Instead of the conventional tobacco control strategies, this paper suggests
a different approach based on the individual's irrational decision-making in
smoking initiation or failing smoking cessation. While the common
strategies appeal to rationality or complicate smoking by modifying
external factors, another way to tackle the problem is to focus on the
psychology of human motivation and try to incentivize individuals to help
themselves.83 The field of behavioral economics provides insights in human
decision-making processes in economic situations, relying on findings of
cognitive psychology and sociology to contribute to a better understanding
of market participants' actual behavior.8 4 Findings from this field of study
allow inferences on how to influence human decision-making. Numerous
studies suggest that changes in behavior can best be initiated by offering
incentives, particularly positive economic ones.85 As a side note, offering
rewards instead of compelling people to behave in a certain way also takes
into account the common criticism of paternalism,8 as it offers and
addressees freedom of choice. Accordingly, reward systems establish a
"libertarian paternalism," a term introduced by Richard Thaler and Cass

Sunstein. 8
1. Relevant Deficiencies in Human Decision-Making
The following outlines a number of phenomena in human decisionmaking identified in behavioral economics, which shall be exploited to
develop effective incentives for people to refrain from beginning to smoke
or to stop smoking.

83. Cf. George Loewenstein, Troyen Brennan & Kevin G. Volpp, Asymmetric
Paternalism to Improve Health Behaviors, 298 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2415, 2416-17 (2007).
84. George A. Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 411 passim (2002).
85. Cf. Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, When and Why Incentives (Don 't)
Work to Modify Behavior, 25 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 191 passim (2011); Robert L. Kane et
al., A Structured Review of the Effect of Economic Incentives on Consumers' Preventive
Behavior, 27 AM. J. PREV. MED. 327 passim (2004); Saul Shiffman & Andrew J. Waters,
Negative Affect and Smoking Lapses: A Prospective Analysis, 72 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 192 passim (2004).
86. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 passim (2006); Mario J.

Rizzo & Douglas G. Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the
Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 685, 686 (2009).

87. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE - IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (2008).
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a. Peanuts Effect
Risk aversion with regard to gains is probably one of the most robust
generalizations in decision-making under uncertainty.88 However, there
appears to be a strong correlation between decreasing risk aversion and
decreasing monetary amounts that are at stake, 89 i.e., people might be
willing to risk one dollar for a ten percent chance of gaining ten dollars
instead of keeping the one dollar while they would decide differently in
case of $100 and a ten percent chance of gaining $1,000.90 This so-called
"peanuts effect" has been demonstrated in several studies.91
The
phenomenon indicates that small rewards become significantly less
attractive at a certain point and are attributed with a negligible value.
b. Overweighting of Small Probabilities
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that decision makers
commonly do not weigh utilities linearly by corresponding probabilities,
but instead overestimate small and underestimate large probabilities.92

88. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 passim (1979).
89. Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, Decision Making Over Time and Under
Uncertainty: A Common Approach, 37 MGMT. Sci. 770 passim (1991). See Bethany J.
Weber & Gretchen B. Chapman, Playing for Peanuts: Why is Risk Seeking More Common
For Low-Stakes Gambles?, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 31
passim (2005), for potential explanations of this correlation.
90. See Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. ECON. 151, 153-55 (1952).
91. Wanjiang Du, Leonard Green & Joel Myerson, Cross-Cultural Comparisons of
Discounting Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards, 52 PSYCHOL. REC. 479 passim (2002);
Leonard Green, Joel Myerson & Pawel Ostaszewski, Amount of Reward Has Opposite
Effects on the Discounting of Delayed and Probabilistic Outcomes, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 418 passim (1999); Daniel D. Holt, Leonard Green & Joel Myerson, Is
Discounting Impulsive? Evidence from Temporal and Probability Discounting in Gambling
and Non-Gambling College Students, 64 BEHAV. PROCESSES 355 passim (2003); Joel

Myerson et al., Discounting Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards: Processes and Traits, 24 J.
EcoN. PSYCHOL. 619 passim (2003).
92. Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, 102 PSYCHOL. REV.
269 passim (1995); George Wu & Richard Gonzalez, Curvature of the Probability
Weighting Function, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1676 passim (1996); Maurice Allais, Le Comportement
de 1'Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de 1'Ecole
Americaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503, 536 (1953); Pamela K. Lattimore, Joanna R. Baker &
A. Dryden Witte, The Influence of Probability on Risky Choice: A Parametric Examination,
17 J. ECON. BEH. AND ORG. 377 passim (1992); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 88, at 263
passim; Craig Glaser, Julia Trommershauser, Pascal Mamassian et al., Comparison of the
Distortion of Probability Information in Decision Under Risk and an Equivalent Visual
Task, 23 PSYCHOL. ScI. 419 passim (2012); Han Bleichrodt, Probability Weighting in Choice
under Risk: An Empirical Test, 23 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 185 passim (2001); Rong Chen
& Jianmin Jia, Consumer Choices Under Small Probabilities: Overweighting or
Underweighting?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 5 passim (2005).
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People, therefore, tend to be risk-seeking when faced with a small chance of
winning a large amount.93 This phenomenon is exploited in commercial
lotteries and can be seen as one important factor for their success. It further
suggests that people consider the probabilities of winning to be higher than
their actual chances.94 With regard to lotteries it appears that people with
low income are even more susceptible to this effect. 95
c. Overconfidence
The overconfidence bias, i.e., the over-assessment of one's own
capabilities and knowledge - a vast majority deems their skills to be above
average 96 - is one of the best proven phenomena in cognitive psychology.97
At the same time, it constitutes one of the central aspects of behavioral
economics. Overconfidence is closely related to disposedness, to overoptimism, and to wishful thinking.98 With regard to the purposes of this
article, the following focuses on one aspect of overconfidence: the illusion
to be able to control a specific situation although there apparently is no
possibility to take influence. 99 In a study conducted by Langer,100
participants were supposed to state the amount of money for which they
would resell a lottery ticket they had previously bought for one dollar. For
one-half of the participants the tickets were distributed randomly,
participants of the other half had to choose a ticket for themselves. The first
group on average asked for $1.96 for the resale, while the second group
93. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 88, at 265-68.
94. Cf. id. at 281.
95. Emily Haisley et al., The Impact of Alternative Incentive Schemes on Completion of
Health Risk Assessments, 26 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 184 passim (2012); Mauro F.
Guill6n & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit
Accounts, 21 J. FINAN SERVICES RES., 219, 224 (2002).
96. Mark D. Alicke, Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and
Controllability of Trait Adjectives, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1621 passim (1985);
Ola Svenson, Are we All Less Risky and More Skillful than our Fellow Drivers? 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143 passim (1981).
97. Kent Daniel & Sheridan Titman, Market Efficiency in an Irrational World, 55
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 28, 28-29 (1999); Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and
Profit- When All Traders Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887, 1892-1893 (1998).
98. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 passim (1980); Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: SelfServing Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
636 passim (1987); Colin F. Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306 (1999).
99. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
311 passim (1975); Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The
Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951 passim (1975).
100. Langer, supra note 99, at 315.
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asked for an amount more than four times as high of $8.67. This suggests
that members of the latter group assigned greater chances of winning to the
ticket after having chosen it themselves.
d. Present Bias
The present bias, i.e., people perceiving immediate payoffs significantly
more salient than future payoffs instead of simply discounting them in a
time-consistent manner, has been shown in several studies.101 It is
commonly attributed to a dual decision-making system: while the so-called
affective system prefers immediate gratification and sharply discounts all
future periods, the deliberative system tends to long-term plans with higher
discount factors. 102
e. Mental Accounting
Mental accounting is a mechanism to reduce complexity and typically
occurs unknowingly.103
People tend to disregard or even ignore
dependencies between specific economically connected projects. Instead of
including all aspects of a situation in their entirety, people focus on one
"mental account" which only relates to a section. The accounts are each
administered for themselves with regard to relative gains and losses relating
to a neutral center of reference. Interconnections to other accounts are
suppressed. 104
Apart from the missing interconnection, the mere existence of different
101. See George Ainslie, Specious reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and
Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 464 (1975); George A. Akerlof & Ross D.
Milbourne, The Short-Run Demand for Money: A New Look at an Old Problem, 72 AM.
EcoN. REv. 35 passim (1982); B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Addiction and CueTriggered Decision Processes, 94 AM. EcON. REv. 1558 passim (2004); See George
Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an
Interpretation, 107 Q. J. EcON. 573 passim (1992); Samuel M. McClure, David I. Laibson &
George Loewenstein, Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary
Rewards, 306 Sci. 503 passim (2004); Samuel M. McClure, Keith M. Ericson & David I.
Laibson, Time Discounting for Primary Rewards, 27 J. NEUROScI. 5796 passim (2007); Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. EcON. REV. 103 passim
(1999).
102. See, e.g., McClure et al., supra note 101, at 503 passim.
103. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEH.
AND ORGANIZATION 39 passim (1980); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer
Choice, 4 MKTG. ScI. 199 passim (1985); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12
J. BEH. DECISION MAKING 183 passim (1999).
104. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453, 457 (1981) (Tversky and Kahneman developed a
famous experiment to illustrate this phenomenon comparing two situations: in the first
participants were supposed to imagine standing at the cash point that they had lost their
ticket to a theatrical performance, in the second they lost the equivalent amount of money).
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mental accounts marks an aspect relevant for the purposes of this article,
illustrated with the following example: when forced into choosing either to
buy a fountain pen for twenty-five dollars or to visit a store within a fifteenminute walking distance where the same pen costs eighteen dollars, the vast
majority of participants is willing to accept the additional stretch.105 In case
the purchase object is a $455 suit that costs $448 in the other store, only a
significantly smaller number of the participants are willing to do so,
although the saving amounts to seven dollars in both constellations. 1 06
Apparently, the sensitivity for values decreases with the relative amount in
question. Therefore, a $100 discount on considerably more expensive
premiums can be expected to be regarded as less valuable than a separate
$100 check because in the latter case the $100 will not be related to the
larger mental account of the premium but will be perceived as an
independent gain.107
f. Loss Aversion
Another robust finding in behavioral economics is that humans
significantly prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains.os As Kahneman
and Tversky have phrased it: "losses loom larger than gains."1 09 Loss
aversion is shown even more reliably for anticipated than for experienced
outcomes 1 o and, therefore, can be qualified as an "affective forecasting
error."
This error has been identified in a variety of situations1 12 and is
105.

DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL - THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR

DECISIONS 19-20 (2008).

106.

Id. See also Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.

EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 50-51 (1980); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 104, at 457.
107. Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives - Lessons from

Behavioral Economics, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 388, 389 (2011) [hereinafter Redesigning
Incentives]; Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives
for Smoking Cessation, 360 N. ENG. J. MED. 699, 707 (2009) [hereinafter Financial
Incentives] (referring to Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4
MKTG SCI. 199 passim (1985)).

108. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Making Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268-269 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON.
1039 passim (1991). But see A. Peter McGraw et al., Comparing Gains and Losses, 21
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1438 passim (2010) (showing that loss aversion is weaker when gains and
losses are judged separately, hence differentiating between experiments including tasks that
encourage gain-loss comparisons and those including tasks that discourage them).
109. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 108, at 279.
110. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking Forward to Looking Backward - The
Misprediction of Regret, 15 PSYCHOL. ScI. 346, 347-348 passim (2004).

111.

See Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17

PSYCHOL. ScI. 649 passim (2006).

112.

See, e.g., Bruce G. S. Hardie, Eric J. Johnson & Peter S. Fader, Modeling Loss
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commonly explained with the expected pain of losing something exceeding
the pleasure of gaining it.11' A manifestation of loss aversion can be seen in
the so-called endowment effect, i.e. the phenomenon that people tend to
demand more money to give up an object than they are willing to pay for
obtaining it. 114
g. Regret Aversion
Regret aversion is based on the assumption that the sensations of regret
and rejoicing are widely spread and that people try to anticipate and account
for these sensations when making choices under uncertainty. 1s Several
studies have shown that the desire to avoid regret appears to be an
important factor in decision making.11 6 The effect is amplified if the
respective person has already experienced the specific consequences he
now intends to prevent. Regret aversion affects a variety of preventive
behaviors, such as vaccination among those who fell ill with a disease after
failing to get vaccinated.11
In addition, people tend to assign greater
impact to future regret than it actually has," because they underestimate
their tendency to rationalize and discount losses.11 9

Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice, 12 MKTG Sci. 378 passim
(1993); Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J.
MKTG RES. 119 passim (2005); Richard H. Thaler, Mental accounting and consumer choice,
4 MKTG ScI. 199 passim (1985).
113. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, Joel Huber & Klaus Wertenbroch, When do losses loom
larger than gains?, 42 J. MKTG RES. 134 passim (2005); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 passim (1984); Kermer,
supra note 111, passim.
114. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 passim (1990); Eric
van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion
and the Comparability of Consumer Goods, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 485 passim (1998); Ying
Zhang & Ayelet Fishbach, The Role of Anticipated Emotions in the Endowment Effect, 15 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 316 passim (2005).

115. Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 THE ECON. J. 805, 820 (1982). See also David E.
Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 39 OPERATIONS RES. 961 passim (1982)
(further discussing the role of regret in decision making).
116. See, e.g., Charles Abraham & Paschal Sheeran, Acting on Intentions: The Role of
Anticipated Regret, 42 BRITISH J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 495 passim (2003); Itamar Simonson, The

Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase Decisions, 19 J. CONSUMER
RES. 105 passim (1992); Marcel Zeelenberg, J. Jeffrey Inman & Rik G. M. Pieters, What We
Do When Decisions Go Awry - Behavioral Consequences of Experienced Regret, in
CONFLICT AND DECISION MAKING 136 passim (E. Weber, J. Baron, & G. Loomes eds., 2001).
117. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Elliot J. Coups, Emotions and Preventive Health
Behavior: Worry, Regret, and Influenza Vaccination, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 82, 86 (2006).
118. Gilbert, supra note 110, passim; Kermer, supra note 111, passim.
119. Kermer, supra note 111, passim.
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h. Default or Status Quo Bias
The default or status quo bias describes the phenomenon that people tend
to go with the default option, i.e., the choice that is implied without taking
action or reacting in other ways, instead of choosing a new course of action
even if it were in their best interest. 120 The default bias is particularly
relevant in situations where people lack a strong preference influencing
their decision. 121
2. Selected Studies Proving Effectiveness of Incentives
This section provides an overview on selected studies, which - to a
significant part - rely on incentives to modify human behavior (commonly
based on insights from cognitive psychology), and, therefore, allow
inferences on the potential effectiveness of the model suggested in this
paper.122 Particular emphasis is put on studies dealing with smoking
cessation and those using lotteries.
Incentives have been predominantly successful, in modifying human
behavior in various settings: in the workplace, in the marketplace via
advertisement, in education with regard to attendance, enrollment, or
academic achievement, in stimulating pro-social behavior for instance in the
form of voluntary contributions to public goods like blood or organ
donation, in volunteering, in environment protection, or in the health sector
with regard to tobacco, alcohol, and drug use, physical activity, childhood
vaccination, regular physical checkups, or obesity.
Providing incentives for smoking reduction or cessation has been tested
in various settings. Several laboratory studies indicate that monetary
incentives are suitable for motivating people to become abstinent, though
120.

Sott D. Halpern, Peter A. Ubel & David A. Asch, Harnessing the Power of Default

Options to Improve Healthcare, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1340 passim (2007); Eric Johnson &
Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 Sci. 1338 passim (2003); Daniel Kahneman,
Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-199 (1991); William Samuelson &
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7
passim (1988). See also Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
364 passim (1995).
121. Halpern et al., supra note 120, at 1341.
122. Cf. Gneezy, supra note 85, at 5, (providing a general overview on studies using
incentives to modify behavior); Kane, supra note 85, at passim (with regard to preventive

health behavior); Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy,
and Ethics of Employers' Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 450 passim (2011); Kate Cahill & Rafael Perera, Competitions and Incentives for
Smoking Cessation, 4 COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMIC REVIEWs 1 passim (2011)
(Specifically on smoking cessation); Rebecca J. Donatelle et al., Incentives in Smoking

Cessation: Status of the Field and Implications for Research and Practice with Pregnant
Smokers, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S163 passim (2004).
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only for the short time period that the rewards are disbursed. 123 Moreover,
the degree of success increases with the extent of the reward,1 24 seemingly
up to a certain amount from which an increase is no longer perceived as
substantial by the participants.125 According to observation, progressively
increasing rewards have further improved the outcome. 126 A considerable
number of worksite trials offering incentives for smoking cessation also
indicate the potential efficacy, 127 though the results tend to be less
significant. 128 Again, the studies did not show a long-term effect after the
incentives ended, 129 except for a study conducted by Volpp et al. 130 in which
participants received rewards for completing a smoking cessation program
along with two six-month periods of abstinence. Although the success rate
six months after distributing the last incentive was moderate,131 and might
123. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 121, passim; Sarah H. Heil et al., A Contingent
Payment Model of Smoking Cessation: Effects on Abstinence and Withdrawal, 5 NICOTINE &
TOBACCO RES. 205 passim (2003); R. J. Lamb, Martin Y. Iguchi & Kimberly C. Kirby,
Effects of Target Criteria and Reinforcement Magnitude in Reinforcing Reduced Breath CO
Levels in Smokers not Seeking Treatment, in PROBLEMS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 1994,
RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS 153, 272 (National Institute on Drug Abuse ed., 1995); Maxine L.
Stitzer & George E. Bigelow. Contingent Payment for Carbon Monoxide Reduction: Effects
of Pay Amount, 14 BEH. THERAPY 647 passim (1983) [hereinafter Contingent Payment];
Maxine L. Stitzer & George E. Bigelow, Contingent Reinforcement for Reduced Breath
Carbon Monoxide Levels: Target-specific Effects on Cigarette Smoking, 10 ADDICTIVE BEH.
345 passim (1985); Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized Trial of Financial Incentives for
Smoking Cessation, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 699 passim (2009).
124. Lamb, supra note 123, at 272; Contingent Payment, supra note 123, passim.
125. Heil et al., supra note 123, passim.
126. John M. Roll, Mark P. Reilly & Chris-Ellyn Johanson, The Influence of Exchange
Delays on Cigarette Versus Money Choice: Laboratory Analog of Voucher-Based
Reinforcement Therapy, 8 EXPERIMENTAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 366
passim (2000).
127. Michel Gomel et al., Work-Site Cardiovascular Risk Reduction: A Randomized
Trial of Health Risk Assessment, Education, Counseling, and Incentives, 83 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1232 passim (1993); Leonard A. Jason et al., Incentives and Competition in a
Worksite Smoking Cessation Intervention, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 205 passim (1990);
Leonard A. Jason et al., AWorksite Smoking Cessation Intervention Involving the Media and
Incentives, 17 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 785 passim (1989); Dyann Matson Koffman et
al., The Impact of Including Incentives and Competition in a Workplace Smoking Cessation
Program on Quit Rates, 13 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION. 105 passim (1998); Kevin G. Volpp
et al., A Randomized Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation, 350 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 699 passim (2009).
128. See Donatelle et al., supra note 122, at S170; Gemma Janer et al., Health
Promotion Trials at Worksites and Risk Factors for Cancer, 28(3) SCAND. J. WORK ENV'T
HEALTH 141, 150 (2002).
129. Cahill & Perera, supra note 122, at 7-8; Donatelle et al., supra note 122, at S170;
Geir Smedslund et al., The Effectiveness of Workplace Smoking Cessation Programmes: A
Meta-Analysis of Recent Studies, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 197 passim (2004).
130. Financial Incentives, supra note 107, passim.
131. 35.9% relapse rate in the incentive group compared to 27.3% rate in the control
group. Financial Incentives, supra note 107, at 708.
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even have been influenced by the selection of enrolled participants who
were predominantly white with relatively high education and income, 13 2 the
latter experiment can at least be seen as an indicator for the long-term
potential of incentives for behavior modification.
Another form of incentivized smoking cessation studies, though with
only moderate rates of success, are so-called quit-and-win contests,
typically offering participants to take part in a lottery for a considerable
reward if they managed to quit.13 In particular, due to the predominant
reliance on self-reported smoking status, clear evidence of its efficacy is
lacking. 13 4
Besides experiences with incentives to achieve smoking cessation,
lottery incentives are of particular interest for the purpose of this article.
Lottery incentives have proven effective in a great variety of settings
regarding absenteeism,135 drug use,136 medication adherence,13 employee
performance,138 recycling attitudes and behavior,13 9, and charity. 140 There
also exist two studies including lottery incentives to challenge smoking
behavior; both, however, contain inconclusive results regarding the
effectiveness of lottery incentives. 141 The most comparable study to the
132.
133.

Financial Incentives, supra note 107, at 708.
See Kate Cahill & Rafael Perera, Quit and Win Contests for Smoking Cessation, 3
THE COCHRANE LIBRARY 1 passim (2008); Ellen J. Hahn et al., A Controlled Trial of a Quit
and Win Contest, 20(2) AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 117 passim (2005); Heikki J. Korhonen
et al., National TV Smoking Cessation Program and Contest in Finland, 21 PREY. MED. 74
passim (1992); Tellervo Korhonen et al., International Quit and Win 1996: Standardized
Evaluation in Selected Campaign Countries, 31 PREV. MED. 742 passim (2000).
134. Cahill & Perera, supra note 133, at 2-3. But see Hahn et al., supra note 133, passim.
135. Mary A. Curran & Kent E. Curran, Gambling Away Absenteeism, 17(12) J.
NURSING ADMIN. 28 passim (1987).
136. See, e.g., Sheila M. Alessi et al., Low-cost Contingency Management in Community
Substance Abuse Treatment Settings: A Transition to Delivering Incentives in Group
Therapy, 15 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 293 passim (2007); Udi E.
Ghitza et al., Randomized Trial of Prize-based Reinforcement Density for Simultaneous
Abstinence from Cocaine and Heroin, 75 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 765 passim (2007); Nancy M. Petry et al., Randomized Trial of
Contingent Prizes Versus Vouchers in Cocaine-using Methadone Patients, 75 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 983 passim (2007); Kenzie L. Preston et al., Randomized Trial
Comparing two Treatment Strategies Using Prize-based Reinforcement of Abstinence in
Cocaine and Opiate Users, 41 J.APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 551 passim (2008).
137. Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Test of Financial Incentives to Improve Warfarin
Adherence, 8 BMC HEALTH SERVICES RES. 272 passim (2008).
138. See Karen M. Evans et al., The Effects of Lottery Incentive Programs on
Performance, 9(2) J. ORGAN. BEHAV. MGMT. 113 passim (1988).
139. William D. Diamond & Ben Z. Loewy, Effects of Probabilistic Rewards on
Recycling Attitudes and Behavior, 21 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCH. 1590 passim (1991).

140. Craif Landry et al., Towards an Understanding of the Economics of Charity:
Evidence from a Field Experiment, 121 Q. J.EcON. 747 passim (2006).
141. Thomas J. Crowley, Marilyn MacDonald & Mark I. Walter, Behavioral Anti-
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model suggested here is an experiment targeting obesity by Volpp et al. 142
because of its similar study design with regard to the lottery and its
foundation on insights from behavioral economics. The participants of the
group provided with daily lottery incentives, as well as those of the group
with a deposit contract and additional bonus incentives, performed
significantly better than the control group both over the course of the
experiment, and shortly after the 16-week study.143 However, participants
regained weight quickly after the experiment ended. 144 An interesting aspect
is that the average costs were considerably higher for the deposit contract
group ($378.49) than for the lottery incentive group ($272.80).145
D. Payment for Non-Smoking?
One apparent problem with an incentivizing mechanism that distributes
money for not smoking is the notion that people are rewarded to give up a
habit they themselves chose to develop, while others who resisted or
managed to quit on their own receive nothing. The latter group may
perceive such treatment as unfair.14 6 What seems to be understandable from
the individual's point of view can be disregarded in light of the
mechanism's overall potential to diminish the number of smokers. Thus,
outweighing the individual's perception of being disadvantaged. In
addition, providing adult non-smokers with incentives for refraining from
doing something they do not want to do is evidently redundant and a waste
of resources.
Naturally, the regulatory paternalism approach is a another major
concern, in particular because of the solicitude of the state trying to
influence the private way to lead one's life and acting coercively or even
potentially discriminatorily. Although incentives to encourage people to
behave in a certain way only constitute a rather alleviated "libertarian
paternalism,"" the state undeniably tries to influence the individual's
behavior and explicitly stipulates a specific behavior, non-smoking, as
desirable. A coercive or discriminatory effect mainly depends on the
specific design of the mechanism. For instance, if the reward is significant,

Smoking

Trial

in

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease Patients,
119
193 passim (1995); Michel Gomel et al., Work-Site Cardiovascular
Risk Reduction: A Randomized Trial of Health Risk Assessment, Education, Counseling, and
Incentives, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1232, 1232-36 passim (1993).
142. Volpp et al., infra note 172, passim.
143. Volpp et al., infra note 172, at 2635.
144. Volpp et al., infra note 172, at 2635.
145. Volpp et al., infra note 172, at 2635.
146. Cf. Redesigning Incentives, supra note 107, at 390.
147. See supra Part I.C.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
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it might force people of low socioeconomic status to comply, as they cannot
afford to forgo the additional income. While the mechanism shall, and
can, 148 be structured in a way to avoid coercion and discrimination as far as
possible, the intended modification of behavior requires a justification.
The main reason for the state trying to incentivize people to help
themselves is the responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Evidently,
smoking poses a significant threat to smokers' health, which they seem
incapable of guarding themselves against under the current tobacco control
strategies as shown by the percentage of failed cessation attempts 149 and the
initiation rates among youths. People of low socioeconomic status and
especially adolescents, who are even more vulnerable, are in particular need
of protection and are affected disproportionately.15 0 Hence, it can very well
be considered the state's obligation to take further action to protect its
citizens. The state also seems in the best position to administer an
incentivizing mechanism in an impartial, transparent, and non-coercive or
discriminating way. Another important aspect is the fact that the intensity of
the paternalistic interference with people's private way of life is very low,
given that one can simply decide not to participate in the incentivizing
mechanism and then will not be affected at all.
One might question whether the state's intervention is desirable from an
economical perspective. It is evident that smoking causes considerable
intangible costs, namely the pain and suffering of smokers, secondhand
smokers, and their affiliates, thereby creating a strong moral and ethical
responsibility to intervene. However, these intangible costs play no role in
an economic assessment of whether smoking is disadvantageous. From a
purely economic point of view, a model that provides economic incentives
for non-smoking is favorable only if it leads to a more efficient allocation of
resources compared to the existing system. This depends on whether the
above-mentioned15 1 tobacco-related expenditures outweigh the program's
benefits. Instead of dealing with this highly controversial question1 52 that due to its complexity and considerable dependency on estimates - seems
virtually impossible to assess, this article looks at the government's
smoking-related health expenditures as "direct" costs of smoking and
presume that tobacco control strategies are economically desirable.
One has to consider that in the long run a respective investment would
help to overcome tobacco use and thereby not only decrease but almost

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Part I.A.
Cf. see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
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eliminate the expenditures caused by tobacco-related health problems.
Since there is no indication that the current tobacco control strategies will
significantly reduce the present number of smokers in the United States, not
to mention the rising numbers in low- and middle-income countries,
tobacco-related health expenditures would remain at a high level for
decades to come. Therefore, it is justified to assume that providing a
considerable amountl53 of money to pay people to refrain from smoking is a
desirable, efficient investment from an economical perspective - again
under the above-mentioned presumption and provided that the incentivizing
strategy is successful. Additionally, non-smokers would profit in the long
run from such a development because the part of the health care budget
currently reserved for smoking-related diseases, which they contribute to by
paying taxes, could be spent in other areas more beneficial for them.
III. A NOVEL REGULATORY MODEL

Based upon the foregoing findings this section will develop a regulatory
approach to significantly reduce tobacco use, particularly among people of
low socioeconomic status, by providing economic incentives for noninitiation and cessation. Subdivided into measures against smoking
initiation and for smoking cessation, the following will outline the
regulatory model and for each subdivision explain the underlying
considerations from a behavioral economics standpoint and develop a
concept for review and verification of smoking status. Finally, the paper
will point out possible funding options and discuss the model's potential
applicability to low- and middle-income countries.
Both tangibility and easy accessibility are of crucial importance for a
successful implementation. In addition, the concept relies on the present
tobacco control strategies in place. The availability of professional advice
and nicotine addiction treatment is an especially necessary supplement to
the suggested model.
A Incentives Against Smoking Initiation
The core of the suggested new model against smoking initiation is a
weekly lottery. Everyone between the ages of ten and twenty-five years,
who has not smoked in the previous four weeks shall be eligible. However,
people older than twenty-two years will not be eligible for entering the
program for the first time as the model seeks to reward a long-time
abstinence from smoking until the age of twenty-five. The time between ten
153.

Evidentially, it is particularly difficult to determine the precise sum that would

constitute the most efficient allocation of resources as this has to be based on estimates,
predicted outcomes and developments and shall therefore not be attempted within this paper.
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and twenty-five years is the critical age for smoking initiation and
developing a smoking habit. 154 Potentially eligible participants shall be
automatically included in the program every year but will be excluded if
they do not attend a scheduled test155 for evaluation of the smoking status.
However, it is entirely the participant's decision to participate.
The lottery shall take place each Monday to offer the reward
immediately after the weekend's particularly tempting social events. The
lottery's conceptual design is similar to the one developed by Kevin Volpp
et al. in their clinical trial to reduce obesity. 156 Each participant chooses a
two-digit number. He may change the number up to every two months or
keep his number for a year before he has to choose again. A two-digit
number is randomly generated each Monday. If the first or the last digit of
the generated number corresponds with a participant's first or last digit, e.g.
the participant chose "35" and the generated number is "37 or "15", the
participant will receive a small payoff. If his exact number is generated, he
will receive a payoff ten times larger than the small payoff. The
participants shall be informed about the results of the weekly lotteries via
email. If they have been smoking, the email will inform them about the
sum they would have received had they not.
All participants will be assigned to specific groups. One major
determining factor of the groups will be based on age, so that all
participants from ten to fourteen, from fifteen to nineteen, and from twenty
to twenty-five will form one group. This shall ensure that the preferences
associated with the participants' age can be taken into consideration. For
instance, the smallest amount of money that can function as an incentive
increases with age. Because of the smaller amount of money a ten-year-old
typically has access to, he or she may be happier about an additional five
dollars every week than a twenty-two-year- old with a job may be. In
addition, a breakdown based on age easily allows for a more tailored
distribution of non-monetary economic incentives.
The second, even more important determining factor will be based on the
participant's statistical likelihood to start smoking. Despite the fact that the
statistical likelihood can only provide a rough indication of risk, it
nevertheless contributes to a better allocation of funds and prevents an
unnecessary distribution of rewards among groups with a very low risk of
smoking. Two groups shall be formed: Group A, shall include participants
with a significant statistical tendency for smoking. Group B, shall be
composed of those with an average or below average risk of becoming a
154.
155.
156.

See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.A.2.a.
Volpp, infra note 172, at 2633.
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smoker. An individual's group membership will depend on several criteria.
As indicated above , socioeconomic status is a very consistent and reliable
factor in determining the probability of smoking: several studies have
shown a negative association between parental socioeconomic status and
tobacco use in their children. 58 The correlation is even more consistent
among adolescents from ten to fourteen years than for individuals aged
fifteen to twenty-one. 159 The participants', which usually means their
parents', socioeconomic status shall therefore be the most important
criterion to determine a participant's group membership. There is also
evidence suggesting an intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior
from parents to their children,1 60 so, the participants' parents' smoking
status shall be a further criterion. This factor shall only be considered in
cases where at least one parent is a heavy (more than twenty-five cigarettes
per day) or an average (ten to twenty-five cigarettes per day) smoker.
Studies also indicate that children who grow up not with both biological
parents but with single parents or with a step-family are more likely to start
smoking.1 61 Accordingly, that factor can be taken into consideration when
determining risk. Other criteria that allow inferences regarding adolescents'
smoking tendencies1 62 are the parents' level of education 63 and, more
importantly, the smoking prevalence within the social network. 164
However, these criteria are either less reliable (like the influence of the
parents' level of education 65) or harder to measure (the smoking prevalence
157. See supra Introduction.
158. See Laura Blow, Andrew Leicester & Frank Windmeijer, Parental Income and
Children's Smoking Behaviour: Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey passim
(May 2005) (ISF Working Papers); Margaret D. Hanson & Edith Chen, Socioeconomic
Status and Health Behaviors in Adolescence: A Review of the Literature, 30 J. BEHAV. MED.
263, 265-68 (2007).
159. See Hanson & Chen, supra note 157, passim; Patrick West, Helen Sweeting &
Robert Young, Smoking in Scottish Youths: Personal Income, Parental Social Class and the
Cost of Smoking, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 329 passim (2007).

160. See Christian Bantle & John P. Haisken-DeNew, Smoke Signals: The
Intergenerational Transmission of Smoking Behavior, DIW DISCUSSION PAPER No. 277
passim (2002).
161. Kelly Musick & Ann Meier, Are Both Parents Always Better Than One? Parental
Conflict and Young Adult Well-Being, 39(5) Soc. Sci. RES. 814, 816 (2010).
162. See Suzanne L. Tyas & Linda L. Pederson, Psychosocial Factors Related to
Adolescent Smoking: A Critical Review of the Literature, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 409, 411-15
(1998).
163. BJORN HBELL ET AL., THE ESPAD REPORT 2003: ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG USE
AMONG STUDENTS IN 35 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 191-193 (2004).
164. Bettina F. Piko et al., A Culture-Based Study of Personal and Social Influences of
Adolescent Smoking, 15 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 393, 393 (2005); Patrick West et al., Family
and Friends' Influences on the Uptake of Regular Smoking from Mid-Adolescence to Early
Adulthood, 94 ADDICTION 1397 passim (1999).
165. See, e.g., Alex Sutherland, Is Parental Socio-Economic Status Related to the
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within the social network) and, therefore, are improper methods for making
a feasible classification.
The three criteria to be used for classification (socioeconomic status,
parents' smoking status, and family situation) are significant and easily
determinable. The criteria shall be conveyed into a marking grid. Each
criterion will be assessed with a certain number of points, which will then
be summed up. The socioeconomic status will be determined based on the
applicable poverty level guidelines plus a specific monthly amount the
participant can dispose of to include more participants in Group A. One
hundred points will be required to qualify for Group A. The parents'
smoking status will count for a maximum of twenty points and the family's
situation for ten points.
Thereby, certain flexibility is ensured in
accordance with the statistical smoking tendency. For instance, participants
who do not receive as many points based on their socioeconomic status
might still qualify for Group A if their parents smoke.
Chances that members of Group A become smokers are significantly
higher than for members of Group B, which makes them the primary target
of the suggested new strategy against smoking initiation. Given that the
members of Group A are also predominantly economically less fortunate
and, hence, monetary incentives will be exponentially more effective, the
rewards shall be at least twice as much compared to those for members of
Group B. One might argue that there is no need to include Group B
members in the program at all because of their lower risk of becoming
smokers and decreased receptiveness to economic incentives. However, a
considerable number of Group B members still do smoke or will probably
start smoking in the future. By including them in the suggested concept
with correspondingly reduced rewards, these group members are guarded
against possible changes in smoking behavior that could only be detected
after they have already occurred, i.e. an increase of smokers with an
affluent background. In that case, particularly in light of the addictive
effect of smoking, efforts to increase smoking cessation might very well be
even more expensive than the anti-initiation efforts. Balancing the
estimated costs and benefits of the two scenarios - including Group B
members in the concept on the one side and excluding them and thereby
accepting the possibility that more of them may become smokers on the
other - the former approach is preferable given the great uncertainty of
future societal developments, the potential suffering, and the much harder to
achieve smoking cessation.
The payoff amount will depend on the participant's age, group
Initiation of Substance Abuse by Young People in an English City? An Event History
Analysis, 74 Soc. ScL. & MED. 1053 passim (2012).
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membership, and more generally on the specific environment in which the
model is applied. In order to facilitate reading, the following will use
amounts that could roughly be appropriate for use in the United States. For
adolescents between ten to fourteen years belonging to Group A, the small
payoff for one correct digit could amount to ten dollars or, at the
participant's choice, economic goods with the same or a little higher value,
e.g. movie or concert tickets, books, music, clothes, food vouchers,
magazines, software, etc. The possible replacement of mere financial
rewards with other economic incentives is meant to facilitate funding, by
soliciting companies to donate their products. Two correct digits would be
rewarded with $100 or economic goods. Group B's rewards could amount
to five and fifty dollars. For the fifteen to nineteen year-olds in Group A,
the small payoffs shall increase to twenty dollars and the large ones to
$200. For the twenty to twenty-five year-olds in Group A, they shall be
thirty dollars and $300. Group B members shall be rewarded with half of
the amount in each case. The progression of the rewards does not fully
display the exponentially decreasing relative value of small amounts of
money for young adults compared to adolescents. However, this seems
acceptable as the probability of becoming a smoker decreases with age.
This basic concept shall be complemented by several specifications. The
greatest success of any model against smoking initiation is that its
participants never even try smoking until they have passed a certain age.
This overall objective shall be addressed by offering an additional
incentive. Within the basic concept of a weekly lottery, the consequence of
smoking is not being eligible for the lottery within the next four weeks. To
provide an even stronger incentive than just the temporary loss of the
opportunity of lottery rewards, participants shall be additionally rewarded
for long-term non-smoking. After the first application for the weekly
lottery, each participant shall be provided with an account with a credit
balance of $250, $500 or $750166 depending on whether the participant
belongs to the first, second or third age group. Members of Group B will
again receive half of the respective sum. The credit balance shall increase
continuously after six months of verified non-smoking. After the first six
months, the amount will double, and after six months further it will be
raised by one quarter. From then on, $100 -for Group B $50 - will be
added every six months. After every five years of non-smoking, the
participants can enter an additional lottery that will double their credit
balance if the two-digit number they chose for this occasion is generated. If
a participant is caught smoking or misses any testing, his credit balance will
be erased and he may start again from the beginning. However, given the
166.

Again, these are amounts that might be appropriate for the United States.
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amount in question and the detection test's inability to identify second hand
smoke,16 the credit balance shall only be erased after the third time of
smoking detection to prevent unjust results. While each participant has
access to review his credit balance, he cannot spend the money until he
reaches the age of twenty-five. To avoid participation of smokers close to
this age limit aiming to make easy money, the account shall only be
established if the applicant is younger than twenty-three at the time of
application. It seems worth considering allowing participants to spend the
money earlier on specific causes, e.g. education, or in case of emergency.
In the best-case scenario, a ten-year-old could receive an amount of $3,425
plus interest when he turns twenty-five without having smoked and he
would have the further opportunity of increasing that amount through the
additional lotteries.
In order to encourage at least four-week periods of non-smoking, one
might consider distributing the weekly lottery rewards only in case the
participant also did not smoke within the following three weeks.
A government agency under the authority of the health ministry yet to be
created shall implement and coordinate the whole concept. For the
purposes of this article the agency shall be called "Incentivized Tobacco
Abrogation Agency" (ITAA).
1. Underlying Considerations from Behavioral Economics
The concept against smoking initiation is designed on the basis of the
described insights from behavioral economics. Following these insights,
there are several reasons to adopt a weekly lottery as the essential incentive.
First and foremost, the non-linear probability weightingl68 is expected to
affect the participants' perception of the actual value of the potential
rewards. Instead of arriving at the rational conclusion that the chances of
winning ten dollars or $100 respectively equals an actual weekly value of
$3.33, participants will tend to overestimate their chances of winning.
Thereby, a greater incentive is provided and the resources are invested in a
more efficient way than they would be by regularly disbursing the
corresponding amount. The tendency to discount rewards if they are too
small amplifies this effect. If frequent disbursements were made, the
"peanuts effect,, 169 could only be countervailed by offering higher rewards.
This would in turn lower cost effectiveness. Providing a high probability of
winning ten dollars and a small probability of winning $100 is motivated by
the impact the actual experience of past rewards and the prospect of future
167.
168.
169.

With regard to the verification system see infra Part III.A.2.a.
See supra Part II.C.1.b.
See supra Part II.C.1.a.
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rewards is expected to have on behavior170 as well as the emotional
attraction to small probabilities of large rewards. 1 According to certain
studies, deposit contracts might even provide a slightly more effective
-172
incentive.
However, obligating people to invest their own capital with
the risk of losing it in case of smoking would entail serious legal concerns,
most notably with regard to property rights. With an optional participation,
it seems likely that people of low socioeconomic status particularly will not
be willing to invest their capital in the program simply due to the lack of
disposable funds. In general, the number of participants would likely be
much lower. By supplying participants with an increasing credit balance,
the suggested model at least contains an additional mechanism that is meant
to resemble the concept of deposit contracts.
The decision to provide the participants with rewards in the form of
money or goods was chosen over reductions of healthcare premiums or
other forms of discounts because of the mental accounting phenomenon,173
which states that people tend to attach greater value to rewards than to
discounts. Allowing participants to choose their own two-digit number is
based on the widespread overconfidence 1 74 with regard to the impact of
one's own decisions on future events. It is assumed that the participants
will attribute a greater chance of success in the lottery due to their selection
of the number. This would amplify the expected inaccurate probability
weighting and thereby influence participants to subconsciously attach an
even higher value to the potential rewards. Thus, the freedom of choice
shall contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources.
By offering a comparatively high chance - roughly one in five - to win a
small amount every week, the model attempts to appeal to the present bias,
which leads to a significantly greater incentive to behave in a certain way if
immediate gratifications are offered. Due to the immediate feedback, even
small rewards are assumed to have a substantial impact1 75 contributing to an
170.

Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, Experience-Weighted Attraction: Learning in

Normal Form Games, 67 ECONOMETRICA 827, 836-74 (1999).
171. George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL BULL. 267, 276-278
(2001); Drazen Prelec, The Probability Weighting Function, 66 ECONOMETRICA 497 passim
(1998).
172. Kevin G. Volpp et al., Financial Incentive-Based Approaches for Weight Loss - A
Randomized Trial, 300 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2631 passim (2008); see Leslie K. John et al.,
Financial Incentives for Extended Weight Loss: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 621 passim (2011); see also IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE
POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS DONE passim (Bantam, 2010) (strongly supporting
deposit contracts in general).
173.

See supra Part 1I.C. .e.

174. See supra Part II.C.1.c.
175. Cf. Ainslie, supra note 101, passim; Loewenstein, supra note 101, passim; Richard
H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 23 ECON. STUD. 201 passim
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efficient cost allocation.
Establishing a non-accessible account with a continuously increasing
credit balance that will only be disbursed at the age of twenty-five shall
provide an additional incentive in the form of the expectation of a
significant amount of money. Structuring the program to start with a
substantial amount of money that is increased disproportionally within the
first eighteen months and then continuously supplemented by a smaller sum
will exploit the participants' loss aversion. Although they cannot access the
money yet, the participants should perceive the bank account as part of their
assets, which they would give up in case of smoking. The accumulation of
a substantial sum in a short period of time shall make the loss even more
painful. Of course, the impact is weakened by the present bias.
Informing the participants about the lottery rewards they would have
received had they not been smoking or the amount of the lost credit balance
is meant to appeal to the regret aversion.176 It shall amplify the anticipated
regret, circumvent the desire to avoid it and thereby influence decisionmaking. Given the cheap medium of mass email communication and the
possibility of automatically generated notifications, this feature can be
implemented at very low costs but may nevertheless have a significant
impact on the participants' future choices.
Automatically re-enrolling eligible participants in the program against
smoking initiation in yearly intervals is meant to appeal to the default
bias, 1 and is based on the assumption that an opt-out model retains more
participants than an opt-in model.
2. Review and Verification of Smoking Status
The suggested distribution of rewards cannot be based on the mere word
of participants that they have not been smoking. The risk of abuse would
be too high, particularly given that clinical studies 8 show that even
without a potential reward in play participants tend to be dishonest about
whether they have been smoking. Hence, the implementation of the new
model crucially depends on a reliable method to verify whether a
participant has refrained from smoking. This article suggests introducing a
(1981).
176. See supra Part JJ.C.1.g.
177.
See supra Part JJ.C.1.h.
178.
See, e.g., Geraldine R. Avidano Britton et al., Comparison of Self-Reported
Smoking and Urinary Cotinine Levels in a Rural Pregnant Population, 33 J. OBSTETRIC,
GYNECOLOGIC, & NEONATAL NURSING 306 passim (2004); David A. Webb et al., The
Discrepancy Between Self-Reported Smoking Status and Urine Cotinine Levels Among
Women Enrolled in Prenatal Care at Four Publicly Funded Clinical Sites, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH
MGMT. & PRAc. 322 passim (2003).
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two-prong approach, concentrating on detection through biochemical tests
on the one side and on controlling the sales and distribution of tobacco on
the other. In addition, criminal liability shall serve as a deterrent.
a. Biochemical Tests
At present, there are several biochemical mechanisms available to verify
tobacco use. For the purposes of the suggested model the ideal measure
would be non-invasive and would be accurate, precise, rapid, efficient, easy
to use, and cheap. This article will identify the best verification mechanism
by first comparing the main biomarkers. Next, this article will select the
preferred biological specimen and the corresponding form of testing.
The most common biomarkers for tobacco use verification are nicotine,
carbon monoxide, anabasine and anatabine, thiocyanate, and cotinine.179
Nicotine can be detected in several biological specimens like plasma, saliva
or urine 8 o through various methods."' Due to its short half-life 8 2 of about
two hours,183 nicotine detection only leads to conclusions regarding tobacco
use within eight to twelve hours prior to the test. 184 Carbon monoxide can
be found in blood or exhaled air.185 It is easily traceable but also has a short
half-life of two to eight hours - depending on the level of physical activity
after tobacco use - so it can almost certainly not be detected after 24
hours.186 In addition, while heavy smokers can be identified, the carbon
monoxide concentration does not enable a reliable differentiation between
light and non-smokers.18 The two nicotine-related alkaloids anabasine and
179. Cf. Don D. Gilbert, Chemical Analyses as Validators in Smoking Cessation
Programs, 16 J. BEH. MED. 295 passim (1993); Soc'y for Research on Nicotine & Tobacco
Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, Biochemical Verification of Tobacco Use and
Cessation, 4 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 149, 149-50 (2002).
180. Riley A. Davis & Margareta Curvall, Determination of Nicotine and its Metabolites
in Biological Fluids In Vivo Studies, in ANALYTICAL DETERMINATION OF NICOTINE AND
RELATED COMPOUNDS AND THEIR METABOLITES 583 passim (John W. Gorrod & Peyton
Jacob III eds., 1999).
181. See SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, Biochemical Verfication of
Tobacco Use and Cessation, 4 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 149, 149 (2002).
182. Half-life is the period of time required for half the quantity of a substance deposited
in a living organism to be metabolized or eliminated by normal biological processes.
183. Don D. Gilbert, Chemical Analyses as Validators in Smoking Cessation Programs,
16 J. BEHAVIORAL MED. 295, 298 (1993); Jason Luty, Nicotine Addiction and Smoking
Cessation Treatments, 8 ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 42, 43 (2002).
184. SRNT, supra note 181, at 149-50.
185. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150.
186. SRNT, supra note 181, at 152 (2002). Peter Jatlow et al., assume that the detection
period is only about six to nine hours. Peter Jatlow et al., Comparison of Expired Carbon
Monoxide and Plasma Cotinine as Markers of Cigarette Abstinence, 98 DRUG AND ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 203, 203 (2008).
187. See 1 RUTHERFORD B. H. GRADWOHL, GRADWOHL'S CLINICAL LABORATORY
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anatabine can be detected in urine, plasma, and saliva. 88 They have a halflife of sixteen and ten hours, respectively,189 and allow measuring the extent
of tobacco use.1 90 However, measurement by a gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry is relatively expensive.19 1 Thiocyanate, a metabolite of
hydrogen cyanide, can be detected in plasma, saliva, and urine at
comparably low costs. 192 Its half-life can be from three to fourteen days1 93
but it too lacks the sensitivity to reliably distinguish between light and nonsmokers. 194 Finally, cotinine, the most widely used biomarker for tobacco
use verification,195 is the major proximate, tobacco-specific metabolite of
nicotine. It can be measured at comparatively low costs amongst others in
blood serum, urine, and saliva.1 96 Cotinine has a half-life of sixteen hours 197
- eighteen hours for African-Americans and Chinese-Americans1 98 and nine
hours for pregnant womenl99 - and therefore offers a window of detection
of up to seven days.200 Yet, in the case of light smokers, the common cut-

METHODS AND DIAGNOSIS

814-815

(ALEX C. SONNENWIRTH & LEONARD JARRETT EDS., 8TH

ED. 1980).

188. Peyton Jacob III et al., Anabasine and Anatabine as Biomarkers for Tobacco Use
during Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 11 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS PREVENTION
1668, 1671 (2002).
189. Id. See also Peyton Jacob III et al., Minor Tobacco Alkaloids as Biomarkers for
Tobacco Use: Comparison of Cigarette, Smokeless Tobacco, Cigar and Pipe Users, 89 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 731, 733 (1999).
190. Jacob III et al., supra note 188, at 1671-72; Jacob III et al., supra note 189, at 733.
191. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150.
192. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150.
193. See Volker Schulz et al., Kinetics of Elimination of Thiocyanate in 7 Healthy
Subjects and in 8 Subjects with Renal Failure, 57 KLINISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 243, 247
(1979).
194. Gilbert, supra note 179, at 302. See also 0. P. Foss & P. G. Lund-Larsen, Serum
Thiocyanate and Smoking, Interpretation of Thiocyanate Levels in a Large Study, 46
SCANDINAVIAN J. CLINICAL & LABORATORY INVESTIGATION 245 passim (1985) (studying the

effectiveness of using thiocyanate as an indicator of tobacco exposure).
195. Neal L. Benowitz, Cotinine as a Biomarker of Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Exposure, 18 EPIDEMIOL. REV. 188 passim (1996); Gilbert, supra note 179, at 298.
196. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150; Eva Yeh et al., Evaluation of Urinary Cotinine
Immunoassay Test Strips Used to Assess Smoking Status, 13 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES.
1045, 1045 (2011).
197. SRNT, supra note 181, at 152.
198. See Neal L. Benowitz et al., Ethnic Differences in N-Glucuronidation of Nicotine
and Cotinine, 219 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 1196 passim (1999);
Neal L. Benowitz et al., Slower Metabolism and Reduced Intake of Nicotine From Cigarette
Smoking in Chinese-Americans, 94 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 108 passim (2002).
199. Delia Dempsey et al., Accelerated Metabolism of Nicotine and Cotinine in
Pregnant Smokers, 301 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 594 passim
(2002).
200. Jatlow, supra note 186, at 203; SRNT, supra note 181, at 152.
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off concentration of fifteen ng/mL 201 might already be reached within
thirty-two hours.202

In comparing the different biomarkers, nicotine 203 and carbon
monoxide 204 cannot provide an accurate detection of the smoking status due
to their limited half-life. The only way to guarantee an acceptable detection
rate would be daily testing which is inefficient and hardly feasible.
Thiocyanate has the longest half-life205 but lacks the required accuracy
because it does not allow a reliable distinction between light and nonsmokers.206 Anabasine and anatabine ensure a comparably precise and
accurate verification of the smoking statuS207 but testing is very expensive208
Cotinine complies best with the above-mentioned criteria, as it combines a
comparably lengthy half-life with cheap assays and reasonable accuracy
and precision. 209 Naturally, there is still room for improvement for the
testing mechanism. 210
There are several methods to quantify cotinine varying with regard to
time, accuracy, precision and cost.21
The most feasible and most
common 212 option is a urinary cotinine test. The most promising diagnostic
213
In contrast
product seems to be the so-called cotinine immunoassay strip.
to blood testing it is non-invasive and easy to perform. Further, it is
cheaper and more accurate than testing saliva, which can be influenced by
consuming sugar or wax -214 and is harder to measure. 215
The remaining difficulties are the short time period of detection and the
inability to differentiate between smoking, smoking substitutes, nicotine-

201. See, e.g., SRNT, supra notel8l, at 151.
202. Cf. SRNT, supra note 181, at 152.
203. See Gilbert, supra note 179, at 298; Luty, supra note 183, at 43.
204. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150-52; Jatlow, supra note 186, at 203.
205. Schulz et al., supra note 193, at 247.
206. Foss & Lund-Larsen, supra note 194, passim; Gilbert, supra note 179, at 302.
207. Peyton Jacob III et al., supra note 189, at 733; Peyton Jacob III et al., supra note
188, at 1671-72.
208. SRNT, supra note 181, at 150.
209. But see Jeffrey R. Idle, Titrating Exposure to Tobacco Smoke Using Cotinine - A
Minefield of Misunderstandings, 43 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 313 passim (1990).
210. See Yeh et al., supra note 196, passim.
211. See SRNT, supra note 181, at 150; Yeh et al., supra note 196, at 1045.
212. Benowitz, supra note 195, passim; Gilbert, supra note 179, at 298.
213. See, e.g., John T. Bernert et al., Use of Cotinine Immunoassay Test Strips for
Preclassifying Urine Samples from Smokers and Nonsmokers Prior to Analysis by LC-MSMS, 29 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 814 passim (2005); Yeh et al., supra note 196, passim.
214. See Nina G. Schneider et al., Saliva Cotinine Levels as a Function of Collection
Method, 92 ADDICTION 347 passim (1997).
215. SRNT, supra note 181, at 151.
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containing foods or medicine and second-hand smoke.216 The latter
constitutes a significant disadvantage particularly for those who are exposed
to secondhand smoke at home. While it might incentivize participants to
avoid places where other people smoke and thereby contribute to better
health, it is simply unfair for those who have no chance of avoiding
secondhand smoke at home. However, as presently no easy and affordable
way of verifying whether a person has been smoking or was exposed to
second-hand smoke exists (an investigation seems impractical) this lack of
fairness has to be accepted until a better method has been developed. At
best, it might encourage parents to refrain from exposing their children to
second-hand smoke to ensure eligibility for rewards.
Irregular and unheralded testing stipulated by the ITAA shall countervail
the problem of the short detection period. To establish a reliable system
with a preferably large coverage at reasonable expenses, the tests shall be
conducted in schools, associations, sport clubs, universities, worksites etc.
The cooperation with schools in particular will allow access to a large
percentage of participants and guarantee their presence for unannounced
testing without further logistical resources. It seems feasible that the
personnel, i.e. the teachers or other staff, supervise the testing.
Testing must be so frequent that the participants feel a serious risk of
being detected and that the risk of becoming addicted while passing the
tests can be kept to a minimum. A possible frequency could be four
randomly chosen tests per month. The ITAA will determine timing and
extent of testing and coordinate the distribution of the test materials. As a
further safeguard, one could implement an obligatory additional test within
one day after "winning" the large reward to ensure accuracy. This would
countervail the danger that participants, knowing that they have not been
tested in the previous week, might take part in the lottery under false
pretenses.
b. Controlling Tobacco Sales and Distribution
Besides the biochemical verification, another way of identifying whether
a participant has been smoking could be to track cigarette sales. Such
tracking can only be realized in case the buyer's identity is verified at the
point of sale. As it is impracticable to require verification by ID or drivers
license and to process such data for every pack of cigarettes sold, a feasible
solution could be to allow the purchase of cigarettes only by credit or debit
card. Hereby, every cigarette purchase could be related to an individual.
Such a system would require a corresponding automatic electronic
216.

See R. A. Davis et al., Dietary Nicotine: A Source of Urinary Cotinine, 29 FOOD
821 passim (1991); SRNT, supra note 181, at 150, 157.
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registration with an accompanying data bank. Of course, the development
and implementation would demand for considerable efforts and
investments, but once established the system could more or less work
automatically at relatively low costs. Aligning the data bank information
with the participants' weekly applications to take part in the lottery would
offer a valuable additional safeguard against abuse of the system. The
purchase of a pack of cigarettes would be treated as smoking itself,
disqualifying the participant for the coming four weeks from taking part in
the lottery. As a bonus, such a concept could also make it impossible for
minors to buy cigarettes in a store, for instance by integrating a trigger in
their credit and debit cards that would prevent payment for tobacco
products.
c. Criminal Liability
In addition to relying on the honor system, testing, and controlling
cigarette sales and distribution, an imminent criminal liability will
contribute to the accuracy of the reward system: falsely stating that one has
not been smoking when participating in the lottery will constitute fraud. To
strengthen the deterrent, it could be advisable to raise the degree of penalty
for this particular kind of fraud. However, in light of the comparably small
potential gains, the risk of criminal liability itself should be a significant
discouragement. In order to circumvent the fact that some participants
might not have reached the age of criminal responsibility yet, depending on
the law, parents could be obligated to sign the statement that the participant
has not been smoking in the relevant time period. This would make parents
potentially criminally liable for the accuracy of the statement, of course
dependent on their knowledge of the falsity.
B. Incentivizing Smoking Cessation
The model for smoking cessation will also provide a weekly lottery
designed similarly to the one described above;217 participants choose a twodigit number at least every year, receive a small payoff if one digit
corresponds with the automatically generated "winning" number and a large
payoff for a complete match. The lottery shall also take place every
Monday. Smoking triggers a four-week ban, otherwise everyone above the
age of twenty who is not participating in the program against smoking
initiation and, of course, who is a regular smoker is eligible. Eligibility
ends after fifteen years of participation. The amount of the potential
rewards shall again depend on the participant's inclusion in a certain group,
217.
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which is determined by the severity of the participants' smoking behavior.
Participants who on average smoke more than forty cigarettes per day
constitute Group A, those who smoke less than forty-one but more than
twenty cigarettes are assigned to Group B, and those who smoke between
five and twenty cigarettes, Group C. Following the smoking status
determination of life insurance companies, the model thereby roughly
distinguishes between heavy, average and light smokers. Due to the higher
level of addiction 2 18 Group A will receive the highest rewards, Group B a
half and Group C a quarter of this. The small lottery reward for Group A
shall amount to $15219, the large amount to $150 or - at the participant's
choice - specific economic goods of equivalent or slightly higher value.22 0
In order to more efficiently allocate resources it might be preferable to
reduce the lottery rewards after e.g. five years of smoking abstinence,
assuming that the urge for smoking declines after a long period of nonsmoking.
In addition to the lottery, the model for the smoking cessation program
also includes a long-term incentive in the form of a special account with an
increasing credit balance, which shall be structured as described above.22 1
The initial credit balance shall amount to $750 for Group A, $500 for
Group B, and $250 for Group C members, and the progression shall be the
same. The participants will gain access to the funds after fifteen years of
non-smoking. This period is chosen for several reasons: first, the long-term
health consequences of previous smoking, in particular the risks of cancer
and ischemic heart disease, decline significantly over time - after roughly
fifteen years of cessation they are close to those of a non-smoker,
depending on the intensity and the duration of former smoking behavior.222
218. See supra Part I.B.
219. This again is an estimate that might be appropriate for the United States.
220. See supra Part III.B. Given that the desire to smoke decreases after long periods of
non-smoking, one might think of diminishing the rewards over time as fewer incentives are
needed.
221. See supra Part III.B.
222. See, e.g., Ichiro Kawachi et al., Smoking Cessation and Time Course of Decreased
Risks of Coronary Heart Disease in Middle-Aged Women, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED.
169 passim (1994); Gilbert S. Omenn et al., The Temporal Pattern of Reduction of Mortality

Risk After Smoking Cessation, 6 AM. J. PREv. MED. 251 passim (1990); Qing Qiao et al.,
Mortality from All Causes and from Coronary Heart Disease Related to Smoking and
Changes in Smoking During a 35-Year Follow-up of Middle-Aged Finnish Men, 21 EUR.
HEART J. 1621 (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF
SMOKING CESSATION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 165, 285-287, 303-304 (1990);
Cf. Peter Boyle, Cancer, Cigarette Smoking and Premature Death in Europe: A Review
Including the Recommendations of European Cancer Experts Consensus Meeting, Helsinki,
October 1996, 17 LUNG CANCER 1, 34-35 (1997); Richard Doll et al., Mortality in Relation
to Smoking: 50 Years' Observations on Male British Doctors, 328 BRITISH MED. J. 1519
passim (2004); Michael T. Halpern et al., Patterns of Absolute Risk of Lung Cancer
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As a side note, the mortality rates of smokers who manage to quit before the
age of thirty-five years are similar to those of people who never smoked.22 '
Admittedly, the suggested time period does not offer a solution tailored to
each individual case. However, it constitutes an average peak that is easily
manageable and might in the worst case only prolong the incentivized nonsmoking period more than necessary. Second, the probability of resuming
smoking after a break of fifteen years drops substantially. On the other
hand, participation in the program has to end at a certain point to prevent an
inefficient use of resources by providing rewards to participants who are not
at risk of starting to smoke again.
Additionally, the participants shall have the possibility to voluntarily
invest a discretionary amount of their own funds of up to $5,000 (Group A),
$2,500 (Group B) or $1,250 (Group C) that will be doubled in the
beginning. As with the rest of the credit balance, this amount will only be
disbursed at the end of the term or will be lost in the third case of smoking
detection.
Moreover, one might think of a modification for pregnant women. Given
the potential of adverse long-term effects on the child's health,224 women
shall be further incentivized not to smoke during pregnancy. Besides
participating in the standard program, a pregnancy shall entitle women to a
credit entry of $1,000 on their special account. In contrast to the regular
credit balance, the $1,000 will be disbursed immediately after the child is
born - provided, of course, that the mother did not smoke.
1. Underlying Considerations from Behavioral Economics
The underlying considerations correspond with those outlined above 225
for the program against smoking initiation. In addition, by allowing
participants to invest their own capital on top of the provided credit balance,
the model appeals to loss aversion 226 Loss aversion is expected to have a
greater impact on the participants' decision-making because their own
capital is on the line instead of an amount they receive from the ITAA
Mortality in Former Smokers, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 457 passim (1993); Richard Peto et
al., Smoking, Smoking Cessation, and Lung Cancer in the UK Since 1950: Combination of
National Statistics with Two Case-Control Studies, 321 BRITISH MED. J. 323 passim (2000);
Kenji Wakai et al., Decrease in Risk of Lung Cancer Death in Males after Smoking
Cessation by Age at Quitting: Findings from the JACC Study, 92 JPN. J. CANCER RES. 821
passim (2001).
223. Doll, supra note 222, at 1523.
224. See, e.g., Knut-Olaf Haustein, Cigarette Smoking, Nicotine and Pregnancy, 37 INT.
J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY THERAPY 417 passim (1999); John M. Rogers, Tobacco and
Pregnancy, 28 REPRODUCTIVE TOXICOLOGY 152 passim (2009).
225. See supra Part III.A.1.
226. See supra Part II.C.1.f.
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which they cannot dispose of right away but only after a substantial time
period of non-smoking. Stimulating the participants to invest a larger
amount of their capital based on the overconfidence 227 in their ability to quit
smoking will further enhance the effects of loss aversion.
2. Review and Verification of Smoking Status
The model for smoking cessation poses the risk of misuse in two ways.
First, as in the model against smoking initiation, participants might falsely
claim that they have not been smoking. Second, people might try to
deceive the program about their smoking status, for instance by
exaggerating their smoking to be eligible for Group A rewards or to
participate in the model at all. The safeguard against the former type of
misuse can be structured similarly to the one described above. 228 The
application of chemical tests will be less feasible, as the possibility of
testing a vast number of participants in schools is no longer available.
Employers may be willing to cover a significant percentage of the testing.
However, private employers (unlike teachers in public schools) may have
their own interest in helping their employees to be verified as non-smokers,
which could cause them to tamper with the test results. A potential reason
might be, amongst others, hesitation to deteriorate the work climate or the
desire to pay lower health insurance premiums for the workers. By
controlling the test dates and informing employers only on the day of the
test, the ITAA could at least make such attempts more difficult. The
imminent criminal liability should function as a further deterrent. The
assignment of government-employed testers would involve a smaller risk of
abuse, but would require substantial funds that are needed elsewhere.
Besides biochemical testing and the threat of criminal liability, controlling
tobacco sales and distribution via credit card statementS 229 is again
suggested to ensure a reliable review and verification process.
To prevent an inaccurate assessment of a participant's previous smoking
status, applicants will have to provide a medical statement by their general
practitioner indicating their smoking habits for at least the past year. One
might also think of witness statements by family, friends or co-workers. To
date, there are no reliable methods to accurately determine the precise
number of cigarettes a person has consumed on average per day during the
past months.230 However, several symptoms and medical conditions can be
clearly linked to heavy tobacco use, allowing a reliable identification of
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

Part
Part
Part
Part

1I.C.1.c.
III.A.2.
III.A.2.b.
III.A.2.a.
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heavy smokers. This fact is exploited by life insurance companies to
determine the smoking status of new applicants. The insurance companies'
experience shall be used to improve the verification of the data provided by
applicants on their own smoking status. Admittedly, the margin of error
will be greater for distinguishing between applicants who smoke more than
twenty cigarettes per day and those who smoke less than that and, in
particular, between those who smoke between five to twenty cigarettes per
day and those who do not smoke at all. This rather problematic verification
process shall be supplemented as soon as possible by the credit card data
showing the applicant's tobacco purchases which shall function as a strong
indicator. In the meantime, the criminal liability for providing false
information should establish a substantial deterrent.
C. Funding
Evidently, the suggested model requires a significant amount of capital
assigned to the ITAA. The ITAA's budget shall be structured through a
fund and raised from parties benefiting financially from a decrease in
smoking among the population. These are, to the largest extent, the federal
government and the states due to substantial savings in the healthcare
system if fewer people suffer from smoking-related diseases, but health
insurance companies and employers stand to benefit, too. The former's
expenses would be reduced and the latter would have to pay lower
insurance premiums. The cost allocation shall be based on the estimated
savings. The fund will also be open to donations, particularly in form of
economic goods produced by the donating companies themselves. In light
of the "good cause," such donations might be attractive for companies
because of the potential publicity as well as the advertising created by the
increased use of the products.
A potential challenge in this way of financing is the need for an upfront
investment as the parties' savings231 can only be realized after the suggested
model unfolds its potential. Savings are merely expected. Given the threat
of severe economic consequences for private actors obliged to provide their
share before they can benefit from the concept's effects, they shall only be
required to contribute once a positive impact can be measured. This might
take several years and leaves the state - maybe supported by NGOs - as the
main funder for the first phase. Additional funds could be generated
through a further tax raise on tobacco products, which would
simultaneously function as another deterrent against smoking. Moreover,
funds used for other tobacco control mechanisms might be partially
reallocated. The possibility for participants in the program for smoking
231.
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cessation to use their own funds to increase the potential rewardS23 2 Will
also contribute to the financing.
The suggested model is designed to render itself dispensable in the long
term. Ideally, the model will contribute to a substantial reduction of the
number of smokers and a further expulsion of smoking from public and
private life, making it more and more socially unacceptable. It may even
lead to a point where the complete ban of smoking is a realizable and
desirable undertaking. In any case, if the risk of becoming a smoker
decreases, the incentives for non-initiation can be reduced and if the total
number of smokers drops, the need for cessation incentives also diminishes.
Both would substantially lower the demand for funding.
D. Applicability to Low- and Middle-Income Countries
While the design of the suggested incentive structure can be readily
applied in low- and middle-income countries by customizing the different
groups in accordance with the characteristics, the review and verification
process needs to be adjusted. Of course, it is of crucial importance that the
smoking status can be reliably verified before the distribution of rewards. In
various aspects, this poses difficulties for countries with less sophisticated
and less powerful administrative and law enforcement bodies. The
deterrence by a potential criminal liability 233 naturally decreases with the
probability of being caught, leading to a greater willingness to attempt
fraud. As the suggested mechanism to control cigarette sales and
purchaseS23 4 will likely not be feasible, the process' success will almost
entirely depend on the biochemical testS23 5 Here, problems might arise due
to limited personal resources, wider reliance on the private sector, less
structured short notice availability of participants for testing, the higher risk
of corruption, or the relatively higher costs of cotinine tests. However, the
program should still be able to reach a considerable number of participants,
particularly children and adolescents, through schools, universities and
public institutions. One further concern is that the model's application, at
least in relative terms, will be significantly more expensive due to the much
higher, and still raising, percentage of smoking adults in low-income
countries and middle-income countries.
It is advisable to first focus on the strategy against smoking initiation as
soon as reliable smoking status verification can be provided. With regard to
the strategy for smoking cessation, it may make sense to reduce the number
232.
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of smokers and achieve a certain level of smoking denormalization by
applying the conventional tobacco control strategies prior to implementing
this part of the incentivizing model.
CONCLUSION

The struggle against tobacco use in the U.S. over the last decades, one of
the greatest threats to public health, has been a tremendous success and lead
to a reduction of the percentage of adult smokers by more than half since
1965. However, the broad variety of tobacco control strategies continues to
show little effect on people of low socioeconomic status. This article has
developed a novel regulatory approach relying on positive economic
incentives which, in combination with the existing strategies, has the
potential to significantly diminish the remaining number of smokers in the
U.S. and, perhaps even more importantly, prevent current and future
generations of children and adolescents from starting to smoke. Moreover,
it could function as a model for other countries or might be transferred to
modify other unhealthy behaviors, e.g. to challenge obesity. Admittedly,
the insights from behavioral economics mainly rely on clinical studies with
limited numbers of participants, and the long-term effects of incentivizing
structures to modify behavior are largely unknown. Regardless, the crucial
question is whether - given what is at stake - the government either has to
take action based on the proven potential of incentivizing mechanisms or
wait for further evidence. My choice would be the former.
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